The Employment Equity Act 55 of
Introduction
The Employment Equity Act 1 has been amended to include a specific provision dealing with equal pay claims in the form of section 6(4). Section 6(4) of the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination in terms and conditions of employment between employees performing the same or substantially the same work or work of equal value. The Minister of Labour has issued Regulations and a Code to assist with the implementation of the principle of equal pay. 2 Both the Regulations and the Code set out the criteria for assessing work of equal value as well as the grounds of justification to a claim of equal pay for work of equal value (factors justifying differentiation in terms and conditions of employment). The EEA refers to two grounds of justification in respect of unfair discrimination claims, namely affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job. 3 There is support for the view that these grounds of justification are not suitable to equal pay claims. 4 There is a contrary view that these grounds of justification can apply to equal pay claims. 5 The Labour Courts have not had the opportunity to analyse these grounds of justification in the context of equal pay claims. It is thus necessary to analyse these grounds of justification in order to ascertain whether they provide justifications proper to equal pay claims.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the grounds of justification to pay discrimination as contained in South African law, the Conventions and Materials of the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") and the equal pay
South African case law
In SA Chemical Workers Union v Sentrachem Ltd 7 the applicants alleged that the respondent discriminated against its black employees by paying them less than their white counterparts who were employed on the same grade or engaged in the same work. The Industrial Court held that wage discrimination based on race or any other difference other than skills and experience 8 was an unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court found that the respondent acknowledged the wage discrimination as alleged and committed itself to remove it. As a result thereof, the Industrial Court ordered the respondent to remove the wage discrimination based on race within a period of six months. 9 It is clear that the principle of equal remuneration for equal work was recognised in this case. 10 It is further clear that the Industrial Court considered skills and experience to be objective and fair factors upon which to pay black employees less than their white counterparts. 11 In National Union of Mineworkers v Henry Gould (Pty) Ltd 12 the applicant alleged that the respondent's refusal to implement wage increases to union members retrospectively constituted an unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court remarked that as an abstract principle, it is self-evident that equals should be treated equally. It further remarked that employees having the same seniority and in the same job category should receive the same terms and conditions of employment unless there are good and compelling reasons to differentiate between them. The Industrial Court ordered the 7 SA Chemical Workers Union v Sentrachem Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 410 (IC) (hereafter referred to as "Sentrachem I"). This case was heard in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, which has been repealed. 8 Emphasis added. The Industrial Court in its order at Sentrachem I 439H also refers to length of service in the job as a fair criterion for paying black employees less than their white counterparts.
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Sentrachem I 412F, 429F, 430E-F, 439H.
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Cohen 2000 SA Merc LJ 260 has stated that the principle of equal pay for equal work was established in this case.
11
Emphasis added.
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National Union of Mineworkers v Henry Gould (Pty) Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 1149 (hereafter referred to as "Henry Gould"). This case was heard in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 which has been repealed. S EBRAHIM PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 5 respondent to pay the union members the relevant amount of wages. 13 It regarded seniority as a fair and objective factor to pay different wages. 14 In Sentrachem Ltd v John, 15 the High Court noted that it was common cause between the parties that a practice in which a black employee is paid a lesser wage than his white counterpart who is engaged in the same work whilst both have the same length of service, qualifications and skills constitutes an unfair labour practice based on unfair wage discrimination. The High Court remarked that this was the correct exposition of the law. 16 This was a review application against the award made in Sentrachem I regarding the wage discrimination based on race. This award was set aside by the High Court for lack of an evidential basis to make the award. 17 The High Court regarded length of service, qualifications and skills as fair and objective factors in law to pay different wages. 18 In Mthembu v Claude Neon Lights, 19 the respondent instructed its local management to evaluate each employee and make recommendations as to whether the employee should receive an increase in pay based on merit.
Local management decided that two employees should not receive a merit increase. This decision gave rise to the application. The Industrial Court held that discrimination was absent and that it would not be in the interests of employers or employees to order that an employer is not entitled to differentiate between employees based on their productivity. It further held that an employer is entitled to reward an employee with a merit increase as that increases productivity. 20 It is clear from this case that the Industrial Court regarded productivity as a fair and objective factor for paying different wages. 21
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Henry Gould 1150E, 1158A-B, 1161I.
14 Emphasis added.
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Sentrachem Ltd v John 1989 10 ILJ 249 (WLD) (hereafter referred to as "Sentrachem II").
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Campanella 1991 ILJ 29 has stated that the principle of equal pay for equal work was cemented in this case.
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Sentrachem II 259B-C, 250I, 259D, 263J.
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Mthembu v Claude Neon Lights 1992 13 ILJ 422 (IC) (hereafter referred to as "Mthembu"). This case was heard in terms of s 46(9) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, which has been repealed.
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Emphasis added. See Campanella 1991 ILJ 27, who suggested that the presiding officer in Mthembu's case regarded productivity as a ground of justification to pay differentiation; Campanella 1991 ILJ 29-30 has stated that equal pay for equal work is a crucial element in order to achieve a non-discriminatory policy, and employers should not labour under the misapprehension that productivity is a universally fair S EBRAHIM PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 6 In TGWU v Bayete Security Holdings 22 the applicant admitted that he was not aware of the nature of the work performed by his comparator; neither was he aware of his comparator's educational qualifications or experience. The Labour Court remarked that the applicant expected it to infer that he was discriminated against on the ground of race on the basis that he was black and earned R1 500 whilst his white comparator earned R4 500. The Labour Court held that the applicant had not succeeded in proving that he had been discriminated against. It further held that the mere difference in pay between employees does not in itself amount to discrimination. The Labour Court remarked that discrimination takes place when two similarly circumstanced employees are treated differently on the prohibited grounds. It further remarked that responsibility, expertise, experience, skills and the like could justify pay differentials. The application was consequently dismissed. 23 The Labour Court regarded responsibility, expertise, experience, skills and the like as fair and objective factors for paying different wages. 24 In Heynsen v Armstrong Hydraulics (Pty) Ltd 25 the applicant (a quality control inspector) alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of race in that he earned less than his co-employees (quality control inspectors) who were part of the bargaining unit and who were weekly paid. The applicant did not belong to the bargaining unit and was monthly paid but the work performed was the same as that of his co-employees. The applicant sought an order directing the respondent to remunerate him on an equal pay for equal work basis. The Labour Court noted that there were differences in the terms and conditions of employment with regard to weekly paid and monthly paid employees. 26 It further noted that monthly paid employees were entitled to certain benefits which hourly paid employees did not enjoy. The Labour Court held that it would not be fair if employees who were not part of the bargaining unit were to benefit from that unit while they still enjoyed benefits which were not shared by the bargaining unit. The Labour Court noted that according to the ILO, collective bargaining is not a ground of differentiation, because its fairness is dependent on objective criteria which should be applied objectively.
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justification for pay discrimination. 27 It cautioned that this rule was compelling in an ideal society and should not apply rigidly in South African labour relations due to the fact that collective bargaining was a hard-fought right for employees. The Labour Court characterised the applicant's complaint as wanting to have his cake and eat it. It found that insofar as their might be discrimination, it was not unfair, based on the facts. The application was consequently dismissed. 28 The Labour Court regarded collective bargaining as a possible fair and objective factor for paying different wages. 29 In Ntai v SA Breweries Ltd 30 the applicants, black people, alleged that their employer committed unfair discrimination based on race in that it paid them a lower salary than their white counterparts whilst all of them were engaged in the same work or work of equal value. The applicants sought an order that their employer pay them a salary equal to that of their white counterparts. The respondent admitted that there was a difference in the salaries but denied that the cause of the difference was based on race. The respondent attributed the difference in pay to a series of performance-based pay increments, the greater experience of the comparators, and their seniority. The Labour Court accepted that the applicants had made out a prima facie case but noted that they still bore the overall onus of proving that the difference in pay was based on race. It found that the applicants had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the reason for the different salaries was based on race. The application was consequently dismissed. 31 The Labour Court remarked that the respondent had no legal duty to apply affirmative action measures and somehow increase the salaries of the applicants. It further remarked that the application of an affirmative action measure was a defence which could be relied upon by an employer and did not constitute a right which an employee could use. neutral requirement adversely affects a disproportionate number of people from a protected group and it may also arise in the case of equal pay for work of equal value. 32 It further noted that the use of ostensibly neutral requirements such as seniority and experience in the computation of pay could have an adverse impact on employees from the protected group if it was proved that such factors affected the employees as a group disproportionately when compared with their white counterparts who performed the same work. 33
In Co-operative Worker Association v Petroleum Oil and Gas Co-operative of SA 34 the second applicant alleged that the respondent committed unfair discrimination based on the absence of family responsibility in that employees with family responsibility (dependent spouses and children) received a higher total guaranteed remuneration than employees without family responsibility and this violated the principle of the right to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. The Labour Court noted that the international community acknowledged the fact that workers with family responsibilities constituted a vulnerable group and are deserving of protection. Additional remuneration for these employees was endorsed and encouraged in terms of both national and international law. 35 The Labour Court agreed with the respondent's submission that the definition of family responsibility made it clear that only those employees with dependants may utilise section 6(1) on the ground of family responsibility. The applicants could therefore not claim unfair discrimination on the basis of the absence of family responsibility, which is the corollary of the listed ground of family responsibility. The claim was consequently dismissed. 36 The Labour Court regarded the absence of family responsibility as a justification for paying different wages. 37 In Mangena v Fila South Africa (Pty) Ltd 38 the applicant, a black male, alleged that the respondent discriminated against him on the ground of race in that it paid his chosen comparator, a white female, a higher salary even though the work performed by both of them was the same or alternatively of equal value. 39 The Labour Court found that the applicant had an exaggerated view of the nature of the work performed by him and it rejected his evidence as to the nature of the work performed by both him and the comparator and instead accepted the respondent's version in this regard. It found that the applicant had failed to establish that the work performed by him and the comparator was the same/similar. 40 The Labour Court then noted that the applicant had not pleaded a claim of equal pay for work of equal value. The applicant argued that the Court could take a view on the facts before it as to the relative value of the respective work. The Labour Court remarked that to the extent that the issue of relative value was selfevident, the work which the applicant was engaged in was of considerably less value than that performed by the comparator taking into account the demands made, levels of responsibility and skills in relation to both jobs. The Labour Court noted that Duma relied on section 6(1) of the EEA for her claim of unfair discrimination relating to equal pay. She relied upon the unlisted ground of "geographical location". The Court held that the basis for the differentiation which was the fact that Duma was employed by the Department in one province and not another, appeared to be entirely arbitrary. The Labour Court noted that the amended section 6(1) of the EEA, which was not applicable in this case, was amended to prohibit unfair discrimination on any other arbitrary ground. It held further that the use of the ground of geographical location as a basis for paying employees in one province less than employees in another province for the same work has the ability to impair the dignity of those employees in a manner comparable to the listed grounds and amounts to discrimination. The Labour Court stated that the respondents' baldly denied that it unfairly discriminated against Duma. They failed to explain the reason as to why Senior Correctional Officers in the Western Cape were on a lower salary level than their counterparts in other provinces. The Court held that the respondents were more concerned with the remedy that the applicant sought and whether it was competent for the Court to grant same. 44 The Labour Court held that Duma had successfully proved that she was unfairly discriminated against with regard to her pay. It made the following compensation orders: (a) the respondents were ordered to pay Duma an amount equivalent to the difference between the remuneration she had received from August 2009 to the date of the order and the remuneration she would have received during that period had she been graded on level 9; and (b) to adjust her monthly salary to align with the current remuneration entitlement of an employee who had her job description and who was on salary level 9. 45 In opposed to the 100% rate paid to drivers working longer than two years in terms of a collective agreement amounted to unfair discrimination in pay. The CCMA in essence regarded the factor of seniority as a ground of discrimination as opposed to a ground justifying pay differentiation. The issue before the court was the interpretation of section 6(4) of the EEA, and in particular the issue of the factor of seniority operating as a ground of discrimination. The Workers against Regression ("union") wanted their members to be remunerated at the same rate as those employees who had been working for longer than two years at the appellant. They thus sought a 20% increase in their members' remuneration to bring it in line with the comparator employees' rate. 47 The appellant, in accordance with a collective agreement concluded with the Food and Allied Workers Union ("FAWU"), pays newly appointed employees for the first two years of their employment at 80% of the rate paid to its longer serving employees, after which the rate would be increased to 100%. The Commissioner found that by applying this to its employees, the appellant had unfairly discriminated against them. He ordered that the rate of remuneration be changed to 100% for newly appointed employees and that damages be paid to the members of the union. The Labour Court found that the equal pay framework regards the factor of seniority as a ground which justifies pay differentiation and the Commissioner had misconceived the law by regarding it as a ground upon which pay discrimination was committed. The Labour Court found that the Commissioner determined the arbitration unfairly and he had made an award that was contrary to the case argued by the union. 48 The Labour Court found that the Commissioner's approach was that it amounts to unfair discrimination for the appellant to pay a newly appointed employee who was previously employed by a labour broker at a lower rate than the rate paid to existing long-service employees, irrespective of how short the period of previous employment with the labour broker was. The lower rate of remuneration for newly appointed employees as contained in the collective agreement between FAWU and the appellant came about as a result of FAWU's persuading the appellant to reduce the extent to which it was using the services of various forms of precarious employees, including employees supplied by labour brokers. FAWU also proposed the implementation of a scale that showed the difference between employees who had newly started working and long-serving employees. The 80%
47
Pioneer Foods paras 1-5.
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Pioneer Foods paras 5, 32-33, 36-37, 57. considered to be contrary to the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. 61 The Equal Remuneration Convention does not set out the defences/grounds of justification which may be raised in an equal remuneration claim, neither does the Equal Pay Guide 62 set it out. What is clear from the ILO, however, is that the use of objective appraisals (job evaluation methods) or objective factors to determine the value of the work can (successfully) be raised as a defence to an equal pay claim, as it is not contrary to the principle of equal pay.
Equality Act of the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, a claimant may approach the employment tribunal with an equal pay claim. 63 The tribunal must then determine whether there has been unequal pay in the particular case. An employer faced with a prima facie case of unequal pay may raise the genuine material factor defence. The employer has the onus of proving the defence on a balance of probabilities. The successful raising of the defence means that the difference in the terms and conditions of employment is due to a material factor which is not the difference of sex. 64 Section 69 of the Equality Act 65 sets out the genuine material factor defence in the following subsections as follows:
(1) The sex equality clause in A's terms has no effect in relation to a difference between A's terms and B's terms if the responsible person shows that the difference is because of a material factor reliance on which-(a) does not involve treating A less favourably because of A's sex than the responsible person treats B, and (b) if the factor is within subsection (2), is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
(2) A factor is within this subsection if A shows that, as a result of the factor, A and persons of the same sex doing work equal to A's are put It is clear from subsection (1)(a) of section 69 that if the reason for treating A (the aggrieved employee) and B (the comparator) differently in relation to their terms of employment is not based on sex, then this is a complete defence to an equal pay claim. Subsection (1)(b) of section 69 permits discrimination in terms and conditions of employment based on sex if the reason for doing so constitutes a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. At first blush this section seems to be counterproductive to what the EA seeks to achieve, but this is clarified in subsection (3) of section 69, which states that:
[f]or the purposes of subsection (1), the long-term objective of reducing inequality between men's and women's terms of work is always to be regarded as a legitimate aim.
Section 131(6)(a)-(b) of the EA provides that a job evaluation study that is not based on a system that discriminates on the ground of sex and that is reliable constitutes a defence to an equal pay claim. Item 42 of the Equal Pay Code 67 states that:
[i]f a job evaluation study has assessed the woman's job as being of lower value than her male comparator's job, then an equal value claim will fail unless the Employment Tribunal has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the evaluation was tainted by discrimination or was in some other way unreliable.
Grounds of justification
It is clear from the above analysis of the EA that the following are regarded as defences to an equal pay claim:
(a) the genuine material factor defence 68 and;
(b) a job evaluation study that is not based on a system that discriminates on the ground of sex and that is reliable. [i]f a job evaluation study has assessed the woman's job as being of lower value than her male comparator's job, then an equal value claim will fail unless the Employment Tribunal has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the evaluation was tainted by discrimination or was in some other way unreliable".
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The case law
It should be noted that the case law decided under the repealed Equal Pay Act, 70 which provided for the right to equal pay for work of equal value, and the defences thereto will be analysed below, in addition to the case law decided under the EA. These cases, whilst decided under repealed legislation, are instructive and provide an invaluable insight as to how the courts have (previously) dealt with the specific issues relating to equal pay claims and how they might (possibly) deal with these issues in future litigation. Case law decided under the repealed EPA cannot be disregarded as it forms part of the jurisprudence relating to equal pay claims. It should further be noted that the case law decided by the European Court of Justice and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal will be referred to, but only to a limited extent. Reference to these cases under the analysis of the case law in the United Kingdom should not be surprising, as the tribunals and courts in the United Kingdom readily make reference to the decisions of these courts in their judgments.
Case law dealing with the grounds of justification to equal pay claims
In Secretary of State for Justice v Bowling 71 the respondent was employed by the Prison Service, which fell under the appellant, as a service desk user support team customer service adviser. The respondent claimed in the Employment Tribunal that she was doing like work to that of her chosen male comparator, but was paid less than him. The male comparator held the same post as the respondent but started on a salary of £15, 567 as opposed to the respondent who started on £14, 762. The difference between the starting salaries was due to the comparator being appointed on spinal point 3 in terms of the appellant's salary scale and the respondent's being appointed on spinal point 1. The appellant argued that the reason for this difference was due to the fact that the comparator had more background and experience than the respondent. The Employment Tribunal accepted this explanation in respect of the difference in pay that had existed at the time of appointment. The Employment Tribunal, however, held that this explanation could not apply to the period where the respondent and the comparator had achieved the same appraisal rating, because at that stage the reason of skill and experience had ceased to be a material factor which could be relied on for paying different wages for like work. It
70
Equal Pay Act of 1970 ("EPA"). This Act was the predecessor to the EA in respect of equal pay claims. therefore allowed the respondent's claim in part. 72 On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted the appellant's argument that "it is in the nature of an incremental scale that where an employee starts on the scale will impact on his pay, relative to his colleagues', in each subsequent year until they reach the top". The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted that a differential was built into the pay of the respondent once the comparator had been appointed two points above the respondent in terms of the salary scale and if the original differential was free from sex discrimination then it follows that the differentials in later years too were free from sex discrimination. The appeal was consequently allowed. 73 Where two employees doing like work are appointed on different levels of a salary scale due to skill and experience which is free from unfair discrimination, then the difference in pay in later years will not amount to unfair discrimination. This is only logical. If one employee is appointed on a higher scale than the other and both employees perform well, then the one employee will almost always receive higher wages than the other. It is with regard to an employer rebutting a presumption of sex discrimination relating to unequal pay: "In order to discharge this burden the employer must satisfy the tribunal on several matters. First, that the proffered explanation, or reason, is genuine, and not a sham or pretense. Secondly, that the less favourable treatment is due to this reason. The factor relied upon must be the cause of the disparity. In this regard, and in this sense, the factor must be a 'material' factor, that is, a significant and relevant factor. Third, that the reason is not 'the difference of sex'. This phrase is apt to embrace any form of sex discrimination, whether direct or indirect. Fourth, that the factor relied upon is or, in a case within section 1(2)(c), may be a 'material' difference, that is, a significant and relevant difference, between the woman's case and the man's case". In Coventry City Council v Nicholls [2009] IRLR 345 EAT para 12, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that an employer relying on a genuine material factor defence must demonstrate what that factor is and that the factor is: "(a) A genuine reason and not a sham or a pretense, which existed and was known to the employer at the date that the pay was fixed and which continues to the point of the hearing; (b) That the less favourable treatment is due to this reason. The factor must be a material factor and must be causative, not just justificatory; (c) The reason must not be the difference of sex. This can include direct or indirect discrimination; (d) The factor relied upon is a significant and relevant difference between the woman's case and the man's case; (e) If the factor relied upon is indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of sex, that reliance upon it is justified".
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submitted that this case may apply mutatis mutandis to a claim of equal pay for work of equal value and is not confined to equal pay for like work only.
In Council of the City of Sunderland v Brennan 74 female employees (caterers, cleaners, carers, school support staff) of the appellant claimed that their work was rated as equivalent or was of equal value to that of their male comparators (gardeners, road sweepers, drivers and refuse collectors) but they had not received bonus payments which had been received by their comparators. The appellant argued in the Employment Tribunal that the reason for non-payment was linked to productivity. The Tribunal held that "the bonus schemes enjoyed by the predominantly male groups "had long ceased to have anything to do with productivity." The appellant aggrieved by this finding unsuccessfully appealed the same to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The England and Wales Court of Appeal held that the fact that the ultimate withdrawal of the bonus system had not impacted on productivity in the sense of its being decreased led to a "permissible inference that the bonus system had long since ceased to relate to productivity". The Appeal was accordingly dismissed. 75 Pay differentials between the sexes cannot be justified in terms of a bonus system which has no bearing on productivity, which was the factor which it sought to reward. There must be a link between productivity and the bonus system.
In 133, [135] [136] , the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the appellant's productivity (bonus) scheme did not achieve a legitimate objective because the appellant had failed to apply it rigorously and this resulted in the payments made according to the scheme forming part of the basic wage. The Employment Appeal Tribunal further held that a Tribunal is entitled to seek "evidence that productivity had increased as a result of improvements in the performance of the workers themselves". It is clear from this case that a bonus scheme that is intended to reward productivity must do just that. Where the scheme ceases to reward productivity then it loses its status of being a legitimate means of improving productivity and will fail as a ground justifying pay differentials. qualified this, however, by stating that collective bargaining can be a defence only where the reason for the pay differential is the separate collective bargaining and not the difference of sex. It held that where separate bargaining has the effect that group of a particular sex (females) of similar proportions earns less than another group of a particular sex (males) of similar proportions, this could constitute a complete defence to an equal pay claim which is not sex-tainted. It further held that this would not apply where there is a marked difference between the two groups, because the difference would constitute evidence from which a Tribunal could infer that the process of the separate bargaining was tainted by sex unless the employer furnishes a different explanation. It concluded by stating that "the fact of separate collective bargaining would not, of itself, be likely to disprove the possibility of sex discrimination". 77 Where separate collective bargaining is raised by the employer as a justification to pay differentials between the sexes, the employer has to show that it was not sex-tainted. This applies to a scenario where there is a marked difference in the sex of the groups because a Tribunal will be entitled to infer that the process was sex-tainted. It is further clear from this case that where the pay differentials apply to two different groups of similar proportions then there is no inference to be drawn that the process was or is sex tainted.
In Benveniste v University of Southampton 78 the appellant had taken up employment with the respondent in 1981. It was common cause that the salary offered to the appellant was less than what she would have been offered had there been no financial constraints on the respondent in 1981. The appellant accepted the offer of employment on the understanding that she would be paid the salary that she would have been entitled to had there been no financial constraints on the respondent, once the constraints ceased to exist. The respondent's financial constraints came to an end in 1982. The respondent undertook to increase the appellant's salary slightly by means of pay increments but the appellant found this to be unsatisfactory. that it will remain right to maintain it indefinitely". The Court of Appeal answered the above question in the negative and allowed the appeal. 82 A defence to an equal pay claim cannot be valid in perpetuity without its validity being examined at the time when a claim of equal pay is made. It may be that the application is valid in perpetuity, but this must be proved at the stage when it is raised as a defence. Allowing the defence of red-circling to be valid in perpetuity because the reason for its initial implementation was justified would allow unscrupulous employers to rely on the defence even where the reason for the initial implementation of the red-circling had ceased to exist. 83 In Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board 84 the appellant female was employed by the respondent as a prosthetist. She claimed equal pay to that of her chosen male comparator, who was also employed by the respondent as a prosthetist. The respondent had offered the comparator a higher starting salary (£6,680) than that offered to the appellant (£4,733 [1977] IRLR 123 EAT, the female appellants were employed as inspectors of motor machine parts by the respondent. They claimed that they were being paid less than certain of their male counterparts who were red-circled, for doing the same work. The Industrial Tribunal dismissed their claims and upheld the defence of red-circling as raised by the respondent. The Employment Appeal Tribunal disagreed with the Tribunal and held that the inevitable conclusion on the evidence was that the female appellants would have been redcircled had they not been women. The appeal was allowed and the case was remitted to the Industrial Tribunal to determine the amount of arrear remuneration which the appellants were entitled to (Snoxell v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [1977] IRLR 123 EAT paras 11, 26, 52). In United Buiscuits Ltd v Young [1978] IRLR 15 EAT, the respondent, a female packing supervisor employed on day shift claimed that she was paid less than her male counterparts who were employed on night shift and were red-circled. She sought to be remunerated according to the amount paid to her male counterparts. The appellant's reliance on red-circling as the ground justifying the pay differentials was rejected by the Industrial Tribunal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that "where an employer seeks to discharge the onus which rests upon him under s.1(3) by what may be described as a 'red circle defence', he must do so under reference to each employee who it is claimed is within the circle. He must prove that at the time when that employee was admitted to the circle his higher remuneration was related to a consideration other than sex. It may be that in some cases he can rely upon a presumption that considerations which apply to existing members of the circle apply to subsequent intrants. But where, as here, these considerations are accepted as having eventually disappeared we consider that it is for the employer to establish by satisfactory evidence that this occurred after the latest intrant was accepted. comparator to work for it. Unlike the comparator, the appellant was not offered employment whilst employed for a private company. The appellant's claim was dismissed by both the Industrial Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The main question before the House of Lords was whether the explanation furnished by the respondent for the pay differential constituted a general material factor defence which excluded the difference of sex. The House of Lords held that administrative efficiency could constitute a genuine material factor defence. It noted and agreed with the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that the new prosthetic service would not have been established timeously had it not been for the appointment of the comparator and others like him who were offered an amount of remuneration equal to that which they were receiving from the private company. It further held that the comparator was paid more because of the need of the respondent to attract him. It concluded that the respondent's explanation of the pay differential did amount to a genuine material factor defence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 85 Where there is a need by the employer to attract an employee to its business for legitimate reasons (administrative efficiency), this will amount to a defence which would justify consequent pay differentials. [1987 ] IRLR 26 HL paras 2-3, 5, 8-9, 11, 18-22. In Ratcliffe v North Yorkshire County Council [1995 IRLR 439 HL, the respondent dismissed the female appellants and rehired them at a lower wage. The respondent alleged that it did this because it had to become tender competitive. The respondent had lost a tender to another company whose labour costs were substantially lower than those of the respondent. The Industrial Tribunal found that the need of the respondent to reduce the appellant's wages in order to compete with other companies may have been a material factor, but it was due to a factor based on the difference of sex. The Tribunal found in favour of the appellants and rejected the respondent's explanation as being a justification to the pay differentials. The Employment Appeal Tribunal overturned the decision of the Tribunal. IRLR 525 EAT para 15, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that "as a matter of common sense a change in the circumstances of the business in which the man and the woman are successively employed can (but not necessary will) constitute a 'material difference' between her case and his". In British Coal Corporation v Smith; North Yorkshire County Council v Rattcliffe [1994] IRLR 342 CA 344, the Court of Appeal held that "a "material factor" defence must fail if the employer cannot prove that the material factor relied upon was not tainted by sex". In National Coal Board v Sherwin [1978] IRLR 122 EAT 123 the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that "it is no justification for a refusal to pay the same wages to women doing the same work as a man to say that the man could not have been recruited for less".
85
Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board
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In Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz 86 the European Court of Justice held that an employer may rely on objectively justified economic grounds for pay differentials. It further held that it is the task of the national court to determine whether the explanation furnished by the employer for the pay differentials constitutes objectively justified economic grounds. The Court noted that the measures adopted by the employer must be appropriate to achieving the economic objectives. 87 This case makes it clear that an employer may rely on economic grounds as a justification to pay differentials. It is the duty of the national court to ascertain whether the economic grounds relied on are genuine and achieve the objectives sought.
In Wilson v Health & Safety Executive 88 the England and Wales Court of Appeal was faced with the following questions relating to a service-related criterion which determined pay: "does the employer have to provide objective justification for the way he uses such a criterion, and, if so, in what circumstances?" The Court of Appeal noted that the use of service-related pay scales was common, and as a general rule an employer does not have to justify its decision to adopt them because the law acknowledges that experience allows an employee to produce better work. It held that an employer will have to justify the use of a service-related criterion in detail where the employee has furnished evidence which gives rise to serious doubts as to whether the use of the service-related criterion is appropriate to attain the criterion objective, which is the rendering of better work performance by employees with more years of service. In these circumstances an employer will have to justify the use of the service-related criterion by proving the general rule that an employee with experience produces better work and that this is evidenced in its workplace. 89 The use of a service-related pay criterion is as a general rule legitimate and will be a complete defence to an equal pay claim. It is only when an employee furnishes evidence which casts serious doubt on whether the criterion is appropriate to attain the criterion objective, which is the rendering of better work performance by employees with more years of service, that an employer will be called upon to justify the criterion by disproving the doubt. An employee may therefore challenge a service-pay criterion on this limited ground only. In Davies v McCartneys 90 the appellant argued before the Employment Appeal Tribunal that the Industrial Tribunal committed an error by relying for its finding that the respondent had proved a material factor defence on factors which were also used in the assessment of the value of the work. The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that there is no limitation to the factors which an employer may rely on in proving a material factor defence. It stated that the important part of the defence was that it was based on a material factor which was genuine and not based on the difference of sex. It further held that:
[h]owever, it is our view that an employer should not be allowed simply to say, 'I value one demand factor so highly that I pay more', unless his true reason for doing so is one which is found by the Tribunal to be reasonable and genuine and not attributable to sex. 91 An employer may rely on the factors for assessing the value of work as a defence to a pay differential. In this instance, the factors for assessing the value of the work are capable of justifying the pay differential for genuine reasons which are not sex-tainted.
Grounds of justification
It is clear from the above analysis of the case law that the following are regarded as defences/grounds of justification to an equal pay claim: (a) the comparator was employed on a higher salary scale due to skill and experience; 92 (b) productivity is rewarded in terms of a bonus system; 93 
The Statutory Grounds of Justification in terms of the Employment Equity Act
The EEA refers to two grounds of justification to a claim of unfair discrimination, namely affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job. 101 It should be noted that neither ground of justification in the context of equal pay claims has come before the South African courts. It is thus apposite to analyse the grounds of justification in the context of equal pay claims. It is prudent to deal first with the authorities which have differing views regarding the suitability of affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job to operate as grounds of justification to an equal pay claim. Thereafter, affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job will be analysed in the context of equal pay claims in an attempt to ascertain whether or not they constitute suitable grounds of justification.
In Ntai the Labour Court, dealing with an equal pay claim, remarked obiter that the respondent had no legal duty to apply affirmative action measures and somehow increase the salaries of the applicants. The Labour Court further remarked that the application of an affirmative action measure was a defence which could be relied upon by an employer and does not constitute a right which an employee could utilise. 102 It is clear from the obiter remarks made, that the Labour Court regarded affirmative action as a suitable defence to an equal pay claim.
Meintjes-Van der Walt has suggested that a pay differential in the context of pay discrimination should not be justified on the grounds of affirmative action as there are more constructive ways in which an affirmative action plan could be utilised to address past inequalities without implementing new differentials. 103 The reason for the suggestion that affirmative action is not suitable as a ground of justification to an equal remuneration claim is based on the view that an affirmative action plan could be used more fruitfully elsewhere.
Landman has suggested that affirmative action is a suitable ground of justification to an equal pay claim. He has further suggested that when affirmative action is applied in the context of equal pay claims, it may be that designated employees are paid more than able-bodied white males, who are the only persons who do not belong to a designated group. Du Toit et al have suggested that it is difficult to imagine circumstances where either affirmative action or the inherent requirements of the job could be applicable as grounds of justification to pay discrimination on a prohibited ground between employees performing work of equal value. 105 Cohen has stated that neither the defence of affirmative action nor the inherent requirements of the job applies directly to pay discrimination. 106 Pieterse has suggested that pay-equity legislation should include specific defences to pay-equity claims and that it would be beneficial if the legislation specified the interface between pay equity principles and affirmative action structures. 107 Hlongwane has stated that the EEA does not expressly provide for defences to pay discrimination, and it is thus difficult to reconcile how either the defence of affirmative action or the inherent requirements of the job could justify pay discrimination committed on one of the grounds referred to in section 6(1) of the EEA. 108 It is clear from the above that there are two views regarding the suitability and applicability of affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job to equal pay claims. This results in legal uncertainty, which ultimately affects the equal pay legal framework negatively. An analysis is thus needed to determine the suitability and applicability of these grounds of justification to equal pay claims for the promotion of legal certainty. If one accepts that an equal pay claim is justiciable in terms of the EEA, then affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job constitute the grounds of justification to an equal pay claim ex lege. A finding that neither constitutes a suitable ground of justification to an equal pay claim and that they should therefore not apply as such will of necessity have to be based on sound arguments and suggestions. Put differently, affirmative action and the inherent requirements of the job are grounds of justification to an equal pay claim until the contrary is proved. 
Affirmative action
Section 9(2) of the Constitution 109 provides that in order to promote the achievement of equality, legislative measures may be taken to protect or advance persons who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The EEA gives effect to section 9(2) of the Constitution by regulating affirmative action in the workplace. In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 110 the Constitutional Court stated the following with regard to whether a measure falls within section 9(2) of the Constitution:
It seems to me that to determine whether a measure falls within section 9(2) the enquiry is threefold. The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is whether the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the third requirement is whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality 111
It is self-evident that if a measure does not pass the above enquiry then the measure is not one contemplated in section 9(2) and is not a remedial measure including an affirmative action measure.
Section 6(2)(a) of the EEA provides that the taking of affirmative action measures which are consistent with the purpose of the EEA is not unfair discrimination. The purpose of the EEA is to achieve equity in the workplace inter alia by implementing affirmative action measures to ensure that persons from the designated groups are equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce. 112 Section 15(2) of the EEA prescribes the affirmative action measures to be taken by designated employers. 113 These measures are: (a) to identify and eliminate
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the "Constitution").
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Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) (hereafter referred to as "Van Heerden").
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Minister of Finance v Van Heerden para 37.
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Section 2 of the EEA; s 15(1) of the EEA defines affirmative action measures as those measures that are "designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from the designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace of a designated employer"; also see Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 259 with regard to the comments on the goal of affirmative action.
113
A designated employer is defined in s 1 of the EEA as: "(a) a person who employs 50 or more employees; (b) a person who employs fewer than 50 employees but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or above the annual turnover of a small business as set out in Schedule 4 to the EEA; (c) a municipality as referred to in Chapter 7 of the Constitution; (d) an organ of state as referred to in section 239 of the Constitution, but excluding, local spheres of government, the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service; (e) an S EBRAHIM PER / PELJ 2018 (21) 27 employment barriers; (b) to diversify the workplace based on equal dignity and respect; (c) to reasonably accommodate people from designated groups in order to ensure that they enjoy equal opportunities; and (d) to ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified people from the designated groups on all levels in the workforce. 114
These measures must be reflected in the designated employers' employment equity plan. 115 The measure mentioned in (d) above includes preferential treatment and numerical goals. 116 The question which arises in the context of equal pay claims is whether the preferential treatment as contemplated in section 15(3) of the EEA includes paying suitably qualified persons from the designated groups more than their non-designated counterparts in the workforce in order to ensure equitable representation. On a literal reading of section 15(3) read with section 15(2)(d)(i) of the EEA, it would seem that it does. This reading is, however, not dispositive of the suitability of affirmative action as a ground of justification to equal pay claims, as it still has to be analysed in accordance with the purpose of the EEA and the matrix relating to equal pay claims. It should be noted that chapter 3 of the EEA, which deals extensively with affirmative action, does not apply to non-designated employers, 117 but non-designated employers are nevertheless not exempt from the provisions of section 6(2)(a) of the EEA 118 which lists affirmative action as one of the grounds of justification to an unfair discrimination claim. Therefore, a non-designated employer may raise the defence of affirmative action and by implication may take affirmative action measures within its workplace. 119 The section falls within ch 2 of the EEA, which does not exclude non-designated employers from its ambit.
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See Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 269, who stated that affirmative action measures taken by a non-designated employer falls beyond the framework of statutory employment equity plans and such an employer will have to prove that it is taking affirmative action measures that are consistent with the purpose of the EEA It is apposite to note that affirmative action applies only to suitably qualified persons 121 from the designated groups. 122 The designated groups are defined as black people, women, and people with disabilities. 123 As a corollary to the definition of designated groups it is clear that affirmative action may be relied upon as a ground of justification only in circumstances where the discrimination is based on race, sex, gender and/or disability. To this extent, the justification of affirmative action is of limited application. It then follows that affirmative action cannot be relied on as a ground of justification in circumstances where the discrimination is based on grounds other than, race, sex, gender and/or disability. With the aforementioned in mind, it is then prudent to analyse the suitability of this ground of justification in relation to equal pay claims.
In order to analyse affirmative action as a ground of justification to equal pay claims, the following question is postulated. Does paying an employee from a designated group a higher wage than his/her counterpart from a nondesignated group in order to ensure the equitable representation of designated employees in all categories and levels of the workplace amount to an affirmative action measure? If it does, it would mean that it may be relied upon by an employer as a ground of justification to an equal pay claim based on race, sex and/or gender.
The EEA states that in order to determine whether a designated employer is implementing its employment equity plan in accordance with the EEA, one must have regard inter alia to the number of suitably qualified as prescribed by s 2 of the Act if it wishes to rely on the ground of justification contained in s 6(2)(b) of the EEA.
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The comments made, hereinafter, regarding affirmative action as it relates to designated employers are instructive to non-designated employers with regard to them taking affirmative action measures and raising the same as a ground of justification to an equal pay claim.
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A suitably qualified person refers to a person who may be qualified for a job as a result of one or more of the following factors: formal qualifications; prior learning; relevant experience; or capacity to acquire, within a reasonable period, the ability to do the job (ss 1 read with 20(3)(a)-(d) of the EEA). employees from the designated groups from which the employer may promote or appoint. 124 The EEA does not mention as an affirmative action measure the paying of a designated employee more than the employee's non-designated counterpart. 125 It is submitted that the absence of mention of the higher pay as an affirmative action measure coupled with the reference to the promotion and appointment of designated employees is a strong indication that paying a designated employee more than the employee's non-designated counterparts does not fall within the ambit of an affirmative action measure. In Van Heerden the Constitutional Court stated with reference to the second requirement of the threefold enquiry, inter alia, that if the remedial measures display naked preference, are arbitrary or capricious, then they cannot amount to measures which are designed to achieve the constitutionally authorised end. 126 It is further submitted, in the light of Van Heerden, that the paying of higher wages as an affirmative action measure would amount to naked preference, which would be arbitrary.
Dupper states that affirmative action is a temporary measure that should cease operating once it has achieved its goal (measures) and the duration of affirmative action programmes is intrinsically linked to the justification proffered for their existence. He further states that if the affirmative action measures continue to operate notwithstanding the achievement of the goals, then this will be regarded as discrimination. 127 It is important to note that an employment equity plan cannot be shorter than 1 year or longer than 124 Section 42(a)(ii) of the EEA. See Dupper and Garbers "Affirmative Action" 259, who stated that s 42 of the EEA provides important indications as to the meaning of the term equitable representation as used in s 2 of the EEA.
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Section 15(2) of the EEA.
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Van Heerden para 41. (LAC) para 30, the Labour Appeal Court held that once the appellant had reached its employment targets the preferential treatment (affirmative action) no longer applied and appointments were to be made based on merit. Mushariwa 2012 PELJ 423 has stated that it is cardinal for employers to know if and when they have reached their affirmative action targets as a failure to do so will result in nondesignated employees being subject to discrimination which would be unfair.
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5 years. 128 It is thus clear that an affirmative action measure cannot survive in perpetuity, as it will come to an end once the objective has been achieved.
The following further questions are postulated with reference to paying an employee from a designated group more than his/her counterpart from a non-designated group in order to ensure the equitable representation of designated employees in all categories and levels of the workplace. What will the lifespan of this measure be? Will the employer pay the employee from the designated group a higher salary than a non-designated employee in perpetuity? The answer to these questions will be set out in the form of an example.
For example, with regard to an affirmative action measure regarding appointments (or promotions) of designated persons, the employment equity plan refers to the target of 50% designated employees in all categories and levels of the workplace. Once the employer has reached the target of appointing (promoting) 50% of designated employees in its employ, then the target has been achieved and the affirmative action measure in that regard has come to an end. This means that the affirmative action measure can no longer apply, and if it does, this ultra vires application will be regarded as discrimination which will be unfair. It is difficult to postulate a similar example with the measure being paying a higher salary to designated employees as an affirmative action measure. The difficulty lies in determining the lifespan of the measure, and this results from the measure itself. It is submitted that paying higher wages should not be regarded as an affirmative action measure due to its impracticality and the creation of new pay differentials innate in its application. 129 In Van Heerden the Constitutional Court stated with reference to the third requirement of the threefold test, inter alia, that a remedial measure must not impose substantial and undue harm or constitute an abuse of power on those who are excluded from its benefits, as this will threaten the country's long-term constitutional goal of equality. 130 It is submitted that, based on this, the paying of higher wages should not be regarded as an affirmative action measure due to the potential substantial and undue harm that it would cause to those who are excluded from its benefits. In the light of the above analysis, it is finally submitted that affirmative action is not a suitable ground of justification to equal pay claims.
Inherent requirements of the job
Inherent requirements of the job are not defined in the EEA but they have been given meaning by the Courts. Article 2 of the Discrimination Convention states that any distinction, exclusion, or preference in respect of a particular job based on its inherent requirements will not be deemed to be discrimination. 131 The Discrimination Convention, however, does not provide a definition for the term "inherent requirements of the job". It is then necessary to analyse the meaning of this as developed by the case law.
In Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 132 the Labour Court defined an inherent requirement of a job as referring to an indispensable attribute which must relate in an inescapable way to the performing of the job. 133 In Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 134 the Labour Appeal Court adopted a more flexible approach than the Labour Court by finding that rational and commercially understandable considerations constituted adequate justification to a claim of discrimination on the ground of pregnancy. 135 In Ntai the Labour Court rejected mere commercial reasons as a justification and adopted a strict approach which is akin to business necessity. 136 Du Toit et al suggest that a commercial rationale cannot by itself establish an inherent requirement of the job, and clear evidence regarding the nature of the requirement of the job should be led to place the court in a position to make a finding as to whether or not the employer's decision based on that requirement is reasonable. 137 In Lagadien v University of Cape Town 138 the Labour Court found that proven skills, experience and knowledge were indispensable requirements for the particular job and the refusal to appoint a person who lacked these qualities was permissible within the meaning of the inherent requirements 
